Access to Assisted Conception: A Call for Legislative Reform in Light of the Modern Family (\u3ci\u3eSusan Doe v. Attorney General of Canada\u3c/i\u3e) by Feldstein, Lisa
Canadian Journal of Family Law 
Volume 26 
Number 1 Rethinking Assisted Conception 
2010 
Access to Assisted Conception: A Call for Legislative Reform in 
Light of the Modern Family (Susan Doe v. Attorney General of 
Canada) 
Lisa Feldstein 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.allard.ubc.ca/can-j-fam-l 
 Part of the Family Law Commons, and the Law and Society Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Lisa Feldstein, "Access to Assisted Conception: A Call for Legislative Reform in Light of the Modern 
Family (Susan Doe v. Attorney General of Canada)" (2010) 26:1 Can J Fam L 201. 
The University of British Columbia (UBC) grants you a license to use this article under the Creative Commons 
Attribution- NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) licence. If you wish to use this 
article or excerpts of the article for other purposes such as commercial republication, contact UBC via the 





CASE COMMENT:  SUSAN DOE V. 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA 
 
ACCESS TO ASSISTED CONCEPTION: A 
CALL FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM IN 





Abstract:  This paper explores the impact of laws regarding 
assisted conception and the discriminatory effect these laws 
have in light of non-traditional family forms. Specifically, it 
considers the Processing and Distribution of Semen for 
Assisted Conception Regulations and how these regulations 
serve to exclude certain individuals who do not fit into the 
“traditional” nuclear family model. The author critiques the 
judgement of Susan Doe v. Attorney General of Canada and 
calls for legislative reform in order for the laws to accurately 
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The family has always been an integral part of society, and for 
many individuals, procreation is the goal and purpose of human 
existence. It is, therefore, disconcerting to couples when natural 
conception proves to be an ineffective means of having 
children. In modern society, there is a plethora of options to 
help couples experiencing difficulty achieving a pregnancy. 
However, treatments are not equally available to all members 
of society. Financial restraints aside, individuals outside of the 
mainstream are often unable to access assisted conception due 
to reasons grounded in discrimination and prejudice.1 A 
relatively recent case, Susan Doe v. Attorney General of 
Canada,2 illustrates how sperm donor regulations in Ontario 
serve to exclude individuals based upon age and sexual 
orientation. 
  
The judgments in Susan Doe reflect some of the biases 
and prejudices underlying Canadian law and policy. This case 
provides a basis for a critique of how discriminatory beliefs 
continue to infiltrate Canadian society despite the existence of 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.3 In this case 
comment, I will first discuss the need for legal reform in light 
of changing family compositions and the shift away from the 
traditional family. I will then provide a brief overview of the 
facts, issues, and litigants in the Susan Doe case.  
 
Once the groundwork is laid, I will analyze the 
discrimination that arises in the judgments, drawing on the 
                                                 
1     The discrimination in this case is both explicit and implicit, grounded 
in the legislation, the judicial decision, and social norms. 
2  Susan Doe v. Canada (Attorney General) (2007), 84 O.R. (3d) 81. 
3     Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution 
Act 1982, being schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.   
11. 
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underlying themes of individual and family autonomy and 
equality. In particular, I will consider the discriminatory 
treatment, in both the case and the relevant regulations, of the 
following: men over the age of 40, men who have had sex with 
another man, lesbian women, and women unable or unwilling 
to conceive via sexual intercourse with a man. I conclude, first, 
that there is an absence of relevant and modern legal principles 
that accurately reflect the reality of assisted reproduction and, 
second, that there is a significant need to reform Canadian 
sperm donor legislation in order to eliminate discrimination, 
and to better respect equality and autonomy. 
 
THE CHANGING FAMILY  
& THE UNCHANGING LAW 
 
Families have undergone a transformation throughout the 20th 
century; consequently, traditional families are no longer the 
norm.4 There is an increase of working mothers, lone-parent 
families, and children born outside of marriage; there is also 
the increasing acceptance by Canadian society of these 
changes.5 In addition, courts have slowly begun, in certain 
cases, to allow for a more functionalist approach that 
recognizes non-traditional family units that function as a 
family. In a 1993 dissent, Justice L’Heureux-Dubé recognized 
the changing nature of families and the need to focus on 
underlying values.6 Over the past fifteen years, some majority 
                                                 
4  Mary Jane Mossman, Families and the Law in Canada (Toronto: 
Emond Montgomery Publications Limited, 2004) at 1. 
5  Supra note 4 at17. There is some evidence that queer families are on 
the rise; however, the counting of same-sex couples began only in 
2006 and therefore trends are more difficult to identify. See Statistics 
Canada, 2006 Census: Family portrait: Continuity and change in 
Canadian families and households in 2006: National portrait: Census 
families (Census) (Ottawa: Demography Divsion, 2007) at 12. 
6  Canada (Attorney General) v. Mossop, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 554. 
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judgments have come to accept and respect the preference for 
alternative family arrangements. An additional example of 
functionalism may be found in some legislation, such as the 
Children’s Law Reform Act, which assumes males in particular 
circumstances to be the father of a child, unless proven 
otherwise.7   
 
The gradual acceptance of different family forms is by 
no means an indication that legal frameworks have kept up 
with the times. Specifically, legislation has not yet been 
amended to adopt new legal principles that have been 
established in the common law. For example, thus far, issues 
regarding assisted conception have been resolved on a case-by-
case basis, but have not yet stimulated the Parliament to clarify  
the existing laws.8 The case critiqued in this comment 
highlights the need for legislative reform in light of the 
changing family norms. 
 
Change is difficult to implement, as many policy 
makers have traditional beliefs and ideas about the ways 
families live, but “these ideas are not always representative of 
the broad range of lifestyles prevalent in modern society”.9 
Therefore, a mere call for legislative reform is not sufficient 
because such reform may take the approach of reinstating the 
traditional nuclear family rather than creating laws capable of 
conforming to the changing context of families. As a 
foundation for new legislation, there must first be an 
understanding of the needs and interests of alternative families, 
which may then be used to guide legislators in making 
amendments.  In addition, there must be a greater 
understanding of underlying themes such as autonomy and 
equality that permeate so many legal issues in family law.  
                                                 
7  Children’s Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C-12, s. 8. 
8  Supra note 4 at 190. 
9  Ibid. at 17. 
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Susan Doe highlights the need for more research to be 
performed on alternative families and for the modification of 
the sperm donor exclusion criteria in a way that conforms with 
the changing needs of the modern family.10 
 
In Susan Doe, two particular features of the changing 
family are most relevant: (1) that childbirth is often postponed, 
and (2) that childbirth is no longer limited to heterosexual 
couples. 11 As postponed childbirth and same-sex marriages 
become increasingly common, the sperm donor exclusions in 
Canada simultaneously become increasingly problematic.12 It is 
noteworthy that one of the guiding principles in the federal 
Assisted Human Reproduction Act (“AHRA”) is that “persons 
who seek to undergo assisted reproduction procedures must not 
be discriminated against, including on the basis of their sexual 
orientation or marital status”. 13 However, in the case of Susan 
Doe both of these grounds, among others, were infringed.14  
                                                 
10  Only the Parliament has the power to change the Processing and 
Distribution of Semen for Assisted Conception Regulations, which 
incorporates the exclusion criteria by reference to the Directive in 
which they are found. 
11  In a 2006 Census, Statistics Canada found that 16.2% of same-sex 
married spouses had children and that the number of same-sex 
couples grew dramatically in the previous five years.  As well, the 
Census found that there were more never-married lone parents than in 
previous years. See Statistics Canada, 2006 Census: Family portrait: 
Continuity and change in Canadian families and households in 2006: 
National portrait: Census families (Census) (Ottawa: Demography 
Divsion, 2007) at 12-13. 
12  Based on the fact that children are more common in married same-sex 
relationships rather than unmarried same-sex relationships, and the 
fairly recent legalization of same-sex marriage, I suspect there will be 
a growing interest in assisted conception in the future. 
13  Assisted Human Reproduction Act, S.C. 2004, c. 2, s. 2. Although the 
AHRA is not paramount to the sperm donor regulations, it is relevant 
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BRIEF OVERVIEW OF SUSAN DOE  
 
In the 2007 case of Susan Doe v. Attorney General of Canada, 
a woman sought access to assisted conception. Due to the fact 
that she is in a lesbian relationship, she and her partner decided 
to use the sperm of a male friend, who had previously assisted 
with the conception of their other daughter. However, they 
immediately faced challenges, as the Processing and 
Distribution of Semen for Assisted Conception Regulations, 15 
which fall under the federal Food and Drugs Act,16 do not 
allow men over the age of 40, or men who have had sex with 
another man, to donate their sperm to the general, national 
sperm donor program – to known or unknown recipients - due 
to health reasons. The donor in this case fell into both 
categories. There is one avenue to circumvent this regulation: 
men who are excluded, depending on the reason, may apply to 
the Minister of Health for special permission to donate to a 
known woman. This process, however, involves rigorous 
screening and takes several months longer to process than a 
normal donation. It also involves greater expense than the 
process for recipients using semen from a spouse or sexual 
partner and excludes the possibility of using fresh semen, 
“which is more effective for conception”. 17  
 
                                                                                               
for comparative purposes because it is legislation on a related topic 
for which the Minister of Health is also responsible. 
14  Sexual orientation was recognized as an analogous ground in a trilogy 
of equality rights cases beginning in 1995. See Egan v. Canada, 
[1995] 2 S.C.R. 513, Vriend v. Alberta,[1998] 1  S.C.R. 493, and M. 
v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3. 
15  Processing and Distribution of Semen for Assisted Conception 
Regulations, S.O.R. 96-254. 
16  Food and Drug Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-27. 
17  Susan Doe v. Attorney General of Canada; The Foundation for Equal 
Families et al., Intervenor, (2006) 79 O.R. (3d) 586 at 51. 
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The appellant would likely have taken the special 
access path had the donor agreed. However, he did not feel 
comfortable having his semen stored for a long period of time 
in a sperm bank due to concerns that it would be used to 
impregnate someone other than the appellant. The appellant 
therefore looked to the Regulations to find of way of avoiding 
going down the special access path.  
  
The appellant took issue with the definition of 
“assisted conception”, claiming it violated her s. 7 and s. 15 
Charter rights. The definition of assisted conception in the 
Regulations is stated as, “a reproductive technique performed 
on a woman for the purpose of conception, using semen from a 
donor who is not her spouse or sexual partner”. It was argued 
that this definition is problematic because lesbians “by 
definition cannot be inseminated by a spouse or sexual 
partner”. The court ultimately concluded that because this rule 
also applies to heterosexual women using a donor who is not a 
spouse or sexual partner, it is not discriminatory due to 
underlying reasons of sexual orientation. Both the Ontario 
Superior Court of Justice and the Ontario Court of Appeal held 
that the appellant’s Charter rights were not infringed. The 
donor acted as an intervener in the case, arguing that the 
exclusion criteria infringed his s. 15 rights as well. His 
arguments were heard only to the extent that they advanced the 
appellant’s claim, and were therefore not expressed and 
analyzed to the fullest extent possible. The arguments brought 
forward by the litigants have some merit, but are overall quite 
weak. 18 Despite the weakness of some of the appellant’s 
                                                 
18  In terms of her s. 7 Charter argument, the appellant claimed that she 
suffered psychological harm because the special access program 
required a longer waiting period. In both the author and the court’s 
opinion, this is a weak argument because it is not a deprivation of her 
right to security of the person. The Court of Appeal characterized the 
appellant’s reported psychological harm as “better ... described as 
frustration”. 
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arguments, I respectfully disagree with the Court’s decision 
and argue that it ought to have found for the interveners under 
s. 15 of the Charter as the effect of the Regulations is 
discriminatory toward the donor. However, the Court stated 
that it was unable to decide on this matter due to the scope of 
the intervener’s status and the relief sought.  In the alternative, 
the Court ought to have taken advantage of the opportunity this 
case presented to call for Parliamentary action to remedy the 
discriminatory effect of the Regulations.  
  
At the present time it does not appear that the appellant 
is seeking leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada. 
 
THE EXCLUSION OF MEN OVER 40 FROM THE 
GENERAL ASSISTED CONCEPTION PROGRAM IS 
DISCRIMINATORY AND INFRINGES ON WOMEN’S 
AUTONOMY TO CHOOSE A KNOWN DONOR IN THIS 
CATEGORY 
 
Age discrimination, though an enumerated ground, is more 
difficult to establish than other forms of discrimination, largely 
because age is not a fixed category. 19  Throughout life, an 
individual has opportunity to both take advantage of and be 
excluded from various experiences. It is hardly a legal concern 
that fourteen year olds in Ontario are not permitted to drive or 
that senior citizens may not purchase children’s tickets when 
going to the theatre. However, in Susan Doe the age 
discrimination is alarming because the rule is not applied to 
those over 40 years of age in a universal manner.  
 
                                                 
19  Section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms states 
that, “[e]very individual is equal before and under the law and has the 
right to the equal protection of the law without discrimination and, in 
particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic 
origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability”. 
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The Court of Appeal held that it is not discriminatory 
that men over 40 are excluded from donating their sperm to 
anonymous recipients or known donors who are not spouses or 
sexual partners in the general donor program. 20  It reasoned 
that, firstly, the policy is based on serious health concerns, and 
secondly, that in light of the Donor Semen Special Access 
Program (“DSSAP”), available since 2000, men over 40 are 
entitled to donate their sperm to known recipients who are not 
sexual partners and are therefore not actually excluded. It was 
stated by Justice MacPherson in the Court of Appeal judgment 
that: 
 
[t]here is a clear correspondence between the 
ground of age and the nature of the differential 
treatment. As noted by Dr. Francesca Agbanyo, 
a senior scientist at Health Canada, men in this 
age group are subject to an increased risk of 
spontaneous genetic mutations. The over 40 
exclusion protects unborn children from this 
risk. 21  
   
The donor and Egale Canada Inc., another intervener, 
argued that the DSSAP is an additional, lengthier step that 
younger men need not take and this therefore amounts to 
differential treatment. The court did not agree with the 
interveners as the exclusions are no longer absolute.  I am 
inclined to agree with the interveners and I take issue with the 
fact that no such screening is required of couples capable of 
natural conception or women using the semen of a sexual 
partner or spouse. Health Canada specifies that, “semen 
belonging to a spouse or a sexual partner of the recipient is not 
subject to any of the requirements outlined in the Semen 
                                                 
20  Supra  note 2. 
21  Supra  note 2, at para. 42. 
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Regulations”. 22 Therefore, a man is legally entitled to have a 
child with his spouse at 70 years of age if he so chooses and 
there is no statutory bar to this event. Why is it then that when 
one needs technological assistance older men who are not 
sexual partners or spouses are suddenly subject to these rules? 
As mentioned in the case and quoted above, health is a primary 
concern. But would it not be acceptable to explain this to a 
woman seeking assisted conception and take her consent as 
acceptance of the risk? Surely a woman who has the mental 
capacity to make her own decisions about pregnancy and health 
care, is deserving of such consideration. Failing to give such 
consideration undermines the woman’s autonomy to make 
decisions about her body, and the autonomy of her family, in 
this case, Susan Doe and her long-term partner’s autonomy to 
create a sibling biologically related to their existing child. The 
failure of the court to rectify this problem calls into question 
how much autonomy is really granted to individuals and 
families in these circumstances, particularly women seeking 
pregnancy from someone other than a heterosexual spouse or 
partner. 
  
THE EXCLUSION OF QUEER MEN FROM THE 
GENERAL ASSISTED CONCEPTION PROGRAM IS 
DISCRIMINATORY AND PATERNALISTIC TOWARDS 
WOMEN 
 
Queer men, 23  unlike heterosexual men, may not donate their 
sperm unless they have applied to the Minister of Health for a 
“special access authorization” and are donating only to a 
                                                 
22  Canada Business, Processing and Distribution of Semen for Assisted 
Conception (Ottawa: Health Canada, 2007), online: http://www. 
canadabusiness.ca/servlet/ContentServer?pagename= CBSC_FE/dis 
play&c=Regs&cid=1081944204151&lang=en. 
23  “Queer” is an all-encompassing term and includes men who have had 
sex with another man, but do not necessarily identify as gay. 
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consenting known recipient.24 However, it was held in Susan 
Doe that this differential treatment is not discriminatory. The 
underlying rationale for the exception is health policy, 
specifically, that “medical evidence … establishes that there is 
a higher prevalence of HIV and Hepatitis among men in the 
MSM category”. Granted, men in the MSM category may be 
more likely than heterosexual men to have sexually transmitted 
infections, but this is not to say that all men in this category are 
infected. To exclude all queer men from donating their sperm 
on this basis is bizarre, particularly if the donation is provided 
for an informed and consenting close friend.  
  
The court appears to confuse the issue by claiming, 
“the differential treatment is not discriminatory and does not 
promote the view that gay men are less worthy of being 
parents”.25 The real issue in the case regards discrimination in 
the context of donating sperm, not parenting, and indeed 
discriminates on the basis of sexual orientation, despite the 
court’s allegation that it does not. How could it not 
discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation when the policy 
specifically excludes men who have had sex with men? It is 
absurd to think that a healthy man, who had sex with a male 
once in his life, in the late 1970s, is not entitled to donate his 
sperm to a consenting long-term friend in the 21st century. Also 
concerning is the chilling effect on the formation of 
homosexual families if the application process appears too 
burdensome, embarrassing, or offensive. 26 
                                                 
24  Health Canada, Health Canada Directive: Technical Requirements 
for Therapeutic Donor Insemination (Directive) (Ottawa: Blood and 
Tissues Divsion, 2000) at 2, online: <http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/dhp-
mps/brgtherap/applic-demande/guides/semen-sperme-acces/semen-
sperme_directive-eng.php#2>. 
25  Supra note 2, at para. 43. 
26  Angela Cameron, “Regulating the Queer Family: The Assisted 
Human Reproduction Act” (2008) 24 Can. J. Fam. L. 101 – 121. 
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Drawing on the theoretical perspective of familialism, 
in which ideologies are modelled on “traditional” family 
values, the reasoning behind the MSM exclusion policy 
appears outdated and offensive. Familialism is an approach 
that, according to Katherine O’Donovan, “opens up questions 
about how idealized families (often patriarchal and 
heterosexual) are deeply embedded within social and legal 
policies”. 27Drawing on this “family values” framework, it 
appears as though the reasoning behind the exclusion of queer 
men (and men over 40 years of age) is paternalistic, rooted in 
the traditional practice of men making important decisions on 
behalf of women. The appellant argues that only women 
“whose donors are their spouse or sexual partner … are entitled 
to knowingly and voluntarily accept the risks to themselves and 
to their unborn children associated with conceiving a child with 
the donor of their choice”. 28The appellant contrasts this with 
lesbian women who, as a result of their sexual orientation, do 
not have a partner capable of producing sperm. What are some 
possible explanations for this policy, beyond the stated health 
concerns underlying the regulations? How can one justify 
infringing individual autonomy in such a way?  The Court of 
Appeal clearly acknowledges that the scheme is “not primarily 
concerned with personal autonomy… but rather with health”. 29 
I question whether physical health concerns of such a 
protectionist and paternalistic nature should triumph the 
principles of equality and autonomy in cases where one 
consents to the health risks. 
 
It appears as though legislators grant greater autonomy 
to women with male partners.  One possible reason for this 
discriminatory treatment, raised through the familialism lens, is 
that policy-makers may have thought women were not capable 
                                                 
27   Supra note 4, at para. 28. 
28   Supra note 2, at para. 28. 
29   Ibid. at para. 29. 
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of making decisions relating to families. This line of thinking 
fails to recognize both the autonomy and equality of women in 
society. Lesbian couples are by nature a female unit without a 
male head of house to make decisions. Single heterosexual 
women also lack a male partner and are perhaps thought of as 
less capable. Perhaps these underlying beliefs, which refuse to 
recognize a family as a unit without a male figure, have yet to 
be eradicated from the sperm donor legislation. It is possible 
that they reflect thinking from a different time, when lesbians 
were not able to marry and single mothers were uncommon and 
stigmatized. The Court should have identified this blatant 
discrimination and paternalism, and used this case as an 
opportunity to speak out against these injustices. 
 
THE REGULATIONS ARE DISCRIMINATORY 
TOWARDS LESBIANS, SINGLE HETEROSEXUAL 
WOMEN, AND TO ALL WOMEN SEEKING 
ASSISTED CONCEPTION  
 
The appellant claimed that the Regulations allow only women 
whose donors are their sexual partners to voluntarily accept the 
associated risks; this includes both risks to self and risks to the 
unborn child. The argument is extended to point out that since 
heterosexual women may use known donors, lesbian women 
should be entitled to do so as well. As clarified by the courts, 
heterosexual women using a donor who is not a sexual partner 
are also not entitled to voluntarily accept the associated risks. 
However, the mere fact that a judge recognizes this similarity 
does not suggest that the policy is necessarily correct. While 
the discrimination is not strictly based on sexual orientation, it 
is based on whether or not a woman is in a sexual relationship 
with a man. This policy serves to exclude both lesbian couples 
and single heterosexual women, and this exclusion is not 
justified. The problem arises not because the policy is based on 
health and safety, or even allegedly on sexual orientation, but 
because the policy fails to recognize and balance other 
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important considerations. Two of the neglected considerations 
are the principles of autonomy and equality. 30   
 
This case begs the question: why can mothers not  
choose to assume the risk for themselves and their child? After 
all, mothers who are capable of conceiving naturally may do so 
with men over 40 or men who have had sexual intercourse with 
another man. In addition, throughout the pregnancy, and even 
post-pregnancy, mothers determine the nature and weight of 
their child’s interests. Only women who cannot or choose not 
to conceive naturally are subject to legal principles that 
regulate the source of the sperm. The court attempts to 
reconcile this argument by pointing out that all sperm must go 
through some level of testing, but this fails to acknowledge the 
fact that there is no such testing in natural conceptions.  
 
It is particularly interesting that a reigning principle of 
family law, “the best interests of the child”, is upheld only for 
women using sperm from someone who is not their sexual 
partner. The application judge specified the purpose of the 
Regulations as protecting the “health of women undergoing 
assisted conception, to reduce the risk to women and their 
partners of acquiring transmissible infectious diseases and to 
reduce the risk to their unborn children of acquiring 
                                                 
30  Equality was in fact discussed in the case as the appellant raised a s. 
15 Charter argument in regard to her and the donor.  Both claims 
failed. However, I believe that the analysis only failed to find 
discrimination toward Susan Doe because the appellant selected the 
incorrect comparator group. Rather than comparing lesbians to 
heterosexual women, the comparison should have been, as the judge 
acknowledged, to “women seeking insemination with the semen of 
their spouse or sexual partner.” In addition, the equality argument 
regarding the intervener was dismissed due primarily to 
administrative reasons. The application and appeal court judges failed 
to acknowledge the important issues brought before them by the 
inventors and to take advantage of the opportunity to make much 
needed advances in the common law and human rights movement.  
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transmissible infectious diseases and suffering birth defects”.31
While it is partially true that a woman “seeking assisted 
conception with the semen of her spouse or sexual partner … 
has already been exposed to any risk”, this reasoning applies 
only to the MSM exclusion, and does not imply that the unborn 
child faces no risk at all.32 For example, a woman faces no risk 
to her own health if her sexual partner is over 40, but her 
unborn child faces an increased risk of spontaneous genetic 
mutations. The risks are identical for unborn children whether 
or not the donor is a sexual partner of the mother; however, 
only where the donor is not a sexual partner does the age serve 
as a sufficient reason to exclude. Why is it that the interests of 
the child do not seem to matter in these cases? Both women 
conceiving “naturally” and women using a known donor who is 
a sexual partner are exempt from the application of this 
principle. This differentiation violates the principle of equality, 
confuses the importance of the best interests of the child, and 
points to an inconsistency that ought to be remedied. 
    
CONCLUSION  
 
Patricia Baird has suggested, and I could not agree more, that 
“[w]ell thought out social policy goals are needed” in the area 
of reproductive technologies, and that “the law needs to be 
amended in the attainment of these goals”.33 The 21st century 
family and the role of parents within the family unit are 
increasingly complex. Viewing families through a familial lens 
fails to appreciate the diversity of situations and the integrity of 
the family unit. It is time to start viewing the family through a 
post-modern lens, which views small accounts of the world and 
accepts that more than one true, or correct, path is available.34 
                                                 
31  Supra, note 2. at para. 20. 
32  Ibid. at para. 21. 
33  Supra note 4 at 190. 
34  Ibid. 
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In Susan Doe’s situation, where her male donor is a close 
friend and the father of her daughter, it may perhaps be more 
useful to take account of the specifics of the case, rather than 
treat it as a generic lesbian couple accessing assisted 
conception in the hopes of having a child.  
  
One way to accommodate situations such as the one 
found in Susan Doe is to modify the Health Canada directive 
entitled Technical Requirements for Therapeutic Donor 
Insemination.35 The Exclusion Criteria found in this directive 
could be amended so that known donors who are queer or over 
40 years of age – provided they do not fall into any of the other 
excluded categories – are treated virtually the same as spouses 
and sexual partners who wish to donate semen.36 This would 
require high risk individuals, such as persons who have been 
exposed to known HIV infected blood, to donate through the 
special access program. It would also ensure that recipients of 
anonymous donors’ semen are not exposed unknowingly to the 
risks of semen from queer men and men over 40 years of age. 
Such a scheme would demonstrate greater respect for the 
autonomy of lesbian couples, single women, and heterosexual 
couples unable to conceive and wishing to use a known donor. 
It would also have the effect of treating these groups more 
equally in comparison with women using a known donor who 
is a sexual partner or spouse. In addition, I suspect that most 
known donors and their recipients would take steps to ensure 
that the donor undergoes independent testing prior to donating 
semen.  
 
                                                 
35  Supra note 24. 
36  While requiring these donors to fall outside all the other exclusionary 
criteria treats persons using assisted conception differently than 
persons using natural conception (e.g. a person with active viral 
hepatitis may conceive naturally but would be excluded under the 
Regulations), it is still of utmost importance to uphold the integrity of 
the Regulations and maintain health as a fundamental concern. 
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Although the justices in Susan Doe failed to recognize 
the absence of legal principles that account for modern families 
and assisted reproduction technologies, perhaps the 
government will appreciate the significance of the important 
issues this case raises, and begin to better address the need for 
equality and autonomy in the assisted conception legislation.  
 
 
 
